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Indian Water Settlements:




For most of this century American Indian tribes have
been going to court in an effort to protect their water
rights.  Their claims are almost always based on the
doctrine established in the 1908 Supreme Court case of
Winters v. U.S., which held that Indian tribes have a right
to water that was implicitly created when the reservation
was established.2  Thus, Indian reservations have a
federally reserved water right to sufficient water to meet
the purposes of the reservation.
In the years since Winters was handed down, literally
hundreds of cases have been filed claiming reserved water
rights.  The tribes won many of these court battles, but
this did not mean they could actually gain control over
water resources.  Rather, it often meant that tribes were
awarded rights to water, but they did not have the
financial means to develop and use that water.  At the
same time, the federal government was quite busy helping
non-Indians develop and use the waters that were claimed
by Indian tribes.  Politically, it proved nearly impossible
to stop these upstream water users from diverting rivers
and streams that originally flowed through or past Indian
reservations.3  Thus many of the court victories had a
hollow ring to them.  However, the constant threat of
lawsuits kept many non-Indian water users apprehensive.
After seventy years of acrimonious litigation, both sides
began looking for an alternative to endless court battles.
In the late 1970s the Carter Administration began
exploring the possibility of negotiating, rather than
litigating, disputes over water between Indian tribes and
other water users.  The Reagan Administration followed
this approach, and began a full-scale effort to settle
numerous outstanding water claims involving Indian
tribes.  In 1978 the Ak-Chin Indian Community signed a
settlement.  Two years later the Papago tribe (now the
Tohono O’odham Nation) agreed to a complicated
settlement that involved thousands of claimants.
Proponents of the settlement process declared that a new
era in Indian-Anglo relations had dawned.  Since then
another dozen settlements have been completed.4
The allure of a settlement is still attracting a large
number of tribes to the negotiating table.  Currently the
Department of Interior has thirty-two negotiating teams
in the field, and other tribes are waiting for their turn.
But recently the settlement process has experienced
problems.  The Western Governor’s Association recently
expressed concern over the lack of progress on
settlements.5
This article will briefly examine some of the problems
that have arisen.  These difficulties are grouped into three
subjects for discussion: implementation problems;
funding limitations; and environmental conflict.  A
concluding section discusses the future of the settlement
policy.
IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
One of the alleged advantages of settlements is finality;
once the agreement is signed, the parties can take comfort
knowing their differences have been resolved.  But in
practice, there have been innumerable difficulties
implementing the settlements.  As one Indian attorney
put it, “All too often we get up from the table, and we
have a different understanding of what we have agreed
to.”6  Recently a spokesperson for the Department of the
Interior admitted that many settlements were
experiencing problems: “We have a large number of
settlements that are not settled.”7  At least half of the
fourteen settlements signed to date are experiencing
implementation difficulties: 
C The San Luis Rey settlement still does not have a
source of water.  
C In the Fort McDowell settlement a source of water
was identified but not purchased; now the parties
are finding out that the price of this water is
“extremely expensive.”8
C It has become necessary to seek amendments to the
Fort Peck compact due to conflicts over water
marketing.
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C The Yavapai-Prescott settlement, after only a year,
ran into trouble over reimbursement.
C The Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act
of 1982 (Tohono O’odham) is immersed in conflict
between the tribe and allottees; the original case has
not been dismissed as a result.
C The Colorado Ute Settlement of 1988 was predicated
on the construction of the Animas-La Plata Project,
which has not been constructed due to a host of
environmental and funding problems.
C The compact for the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
in Utah has yet to be ratified by the Northern Ute
tribe and the Utah state Legislature.
C A final court decree has yet to be issued for the
Jicarilla Apache settlement.
The problems became so pervasive that the Department
of Interior established implementation teams for each
settlement in an effort to solve these problems.  Despite
these efforts, the average time it takes to implement a
water settlement has increased dramatically.  This has
created a concern among some tribes that are currently
negotiating that, even though they may sign a settlement
in the near future, there is no guarantee that the
provisions of the settlement will be carried out.  However,
the creation of individual implementation teams is a
promising development, and may ultimately alleviate
these vexatious problems.
FUNDING LIMITATIONS
One of the advantages of negotiating, rather then
litigating, is that tribes can bargain for direct funding as
part of the deal.  Courts cannot allocate money, but the
U.S. Congress, in passing a settlement act, can.  Nearly
every settlement has relied upon a federal allocation of
funding to carry out the provisions of the settlement.
This funding is usually applied to an economic
development fund or water development activity.  In
essence, federal money has been the lubrication that has
greased the settlement wheels.  This makes it easier for
the various parties to forget their differences and reach an
agreement, but it also makes the settlement process
vulnerable to federal budget cuts.
During the Reagan and Bush Administrations the
funding for water settlements was carved out of other
Indian programs.  Thus the net gain for Indian country
was zero.  When the Clinton Administration came to
office, Secretary of Interior Bruce Babbitt attempted to
remedy this unfair practice by establishing a separate
water settlement line item in the budget.  The initial
funding for this item, $200 million in fiscal year 1994,
looked promising, but that amount has been gradually
reduced.  This funding is less than the proponents of
settlements wanted, but at least the money was no longer
being pulled directly out of other Indian accounts.  And
compared to historic spending levels, it was a dramatic
improvement.
But the Republican take-over of Congress in 1994, and
the increased emphasis on cutting domestic spending to
balance the budget, have reduced the likelihood that
Congress will continue to fund adequately the water
settlements.  For fiscal year 1996 the Clinton
Administration requested $136 million for the
settlements.  The House version of the appropriations bill
for Interior provided $114, and the Senate version
dramatically reduced the amount to $13.5 million.  After
President Clinton vetoed the Interior Appropriations bill
for 1996, the Congress agreed to a spending level of $118
million.  For fiscal year 1997 the Clinton Administration
requested $132 million, but only received $94.7 million.
An Interior Department official recently advised
American Indians: “Tribes must seize the opportunity
now, because it is unlikely that Congress is going to
continue to fund large water settlements.”9  There have
been no new settlements since the emphasis shifted to
cost-containment.10
Another threat to settlement funding concerns a basic
philosophical difference between different elements of the
federal government.  The Office of Management and
Budget and some members of congress view settlements
as a cost-cutting device; they want the cost of each
settlement to be limited to the government’s legal liability
if the case were litigated.  In contrast, the BIA and the
Interior Department view the settlements as part of the
trust responsibility; to them, the settlements should be
funded at a level that adequately meets the government’s
moral obligations as trustee.  Of course, this debate will
become moot if the current Congress refuses to fund
future settlements at a level that can garner agreement.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
For many years, federal and state governments built
environmentally damaging water projects that diverted
water away from Indian reservations so it could be used
by Anglos.  Finally, water settlements provided an avenue
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of funding for water development on Indian reservations.
The big problem is timing; the age of big, expensive
water projects is rapidly coming to a close.  Instead, the
government is concerned about the fate of endangered
species, wetlands, wilderness, and recreation.  Thus,
when Indian tribes sometimes attempt to write a water
development project into their settlement, they run
headlong into environmental laws. As a result, there is an
uneasy relationship between environmentalists and tribes.
Environmental groups are stakeholders in nearly all of
the settlements and usually have representatives at the
negotiating table.  At times they have worked closely with
tribes to save habitat and sacred lands and protect native
vegetation and animals, but in other situations they have
been in direct conflict.11
Perhaps the greatest conflict has occurred over the 1988
Colorado Ute water settlement.  The linchpin of the
settlement is a $700 million water project that will pump
water uphill at great cost in order to provide water for
alfalfa farmers.  This proposed project languished for
decades until it was reinvented as an “Indian” project as
part of the effort to settle the water claims of the Ute
Mountain Ute and the Southern Ute tribes.  Although
most of the water from the proposed project would still go
to non-Indians, the project’s role in settling the Indians’
reserved water claims created sufficient support to pass a
re-authorization for the project as part of the 1988
settlement.
However, before construction could begin it was stopped
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service because of its
impact on endangered species.  The project also
engendered law suits from the Sierra Club and other anti-
project interest groups.  Their position was bolstered
when the Inspector General of the Interior Department
issued a report in 1994 that concluded the Animas-La
Plata Project was not economically feasible.12  The project
has still not commenced construction, to the great
consternation of the Colorado Ute tribes.  Judy Knight-
Frank, Chairperson of the Ute Mountain Utes, recently
expressed her frustration: “Presently our water settlement
is not complete because of the environmental issues....
We constantly have environmental groups coming in and
telling us what is best for us, and we have problems with
this because they have not lived our life and they don’t
understand us.”13 In 1996 Congress allocated $10 million
for the project.  In 1997, after extensive negotiations, a
scaled-back version of the project was proposed in an
effort to secure continued congressional funding.
The Navajo Nation, currently negotiating a settlement for
the Little Colorado River, has also experienced conflict
with environmental laws.  The Endangered Species Act
has had a direct impact on the tribe’s water development
plans.14  Recently the Navajo Nation abandoned plans to
build a dam as part of its settlement on the Little
Colorado River.15
Other tribes, however, have expressed unequivocal
support for the Endangered Species Act and other
environmental legislation.  The Pyramid Lake Paiutes,
who signed a settlement in 1990, relied heavily upon the
Endangered Species Act to gain water for tribal fishing.
The Nez Perce Tribe is working with environmentalists
in an attempt to restore anadromous fish runs in central
Idaho.  The Warm Springs Tribe is working with the
environmental Defense fund in a proactive, ecosystems
approach to water management.  And several tribes are
working with environmental groups to develop water
marketing strategies. John Leshy, the Solicitor General of
the Department of the Interior, recently noted that an
ongoing process of close consultation has been
established for the tribes, the BIA, and other Interior
Department agencies such as the Fish and Wildlife
Service.  The objective of this process is to reduce conflict
and enhance understanding and cooperation.16
However, as long as Indian reservations remain less
developed than non-Indian land, there will always be the
potential for conflict as some tribal members move to
develop these lands in an effort to improve tribal
economic self-sufficiency.  Conversely, tribal reverence
for the land will also create support among tribal
members to protect the land and all living things. These
differing values will continue to play an important role in
Indian water settlements.
CONCLUSION
Just a few years ago, negotiated settlements were seen as
the wave of the future--a new era in Indian-Anglo
relations that would heal centuries-old wounds and
permit tribes and non-Indians to work together as
neighbors.  Now a more realistic attitude prevails. Some
tribes have become disillusioned, realizing that
negotiation means not only gaining something, but also
giving up something. The chairwoman of the Ute
Mountain Utes alluded to this recently:  “We had
language in the settlement that gave us what we wanted,
but that got watered down because so many people
wanted something.”17  Another Indian spokesperson made
an even blunter statement: “If we want something done
for our lands, we have come to the conclusion that we
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must do it ourselves.”18
Despite the problems with implementation, funding cuts,
and environmental conflicts, tribes will continue to be
interested in negotiation because the courts are much less
receptive to Indian water claims than they were in the
past. .  Today it is very risky to take a reserved water
rights claim to court, either at the state level or to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Indian attorney Jeanne Whiteing
spelled out this stark reality: “While the results of
settlements are not completely encouraging, the risks of
litigation appear much more significant than they have in
the past.  In some cases, tribal decisions are being
 driven not by the fact that negotiations are so much
better, but because the results of litigation are potentially
so much worse.”19  Ultimately, the settlements are much
more than just water settlements; they are, in a larger
sense, sovereignty settlements because they decide issues
of control and destiny.  They involve water marketing,
land acquisition and use, administrative control, and
culturally sensitive water uses.  And in nearly every
settlement, the tribes must relinquish their right to future
claims to reserved water rights--forever.  Thus, the
settlement era is, in effect, a second treaty-making era.
The first treaty-making era was concerned with land; this
one involves water.  If reservations are going to serve as
viable homelands, they must have both.
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